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Abstract
We consider social choice problems where different agents can have different sets of
admissible single-peaked preferences. We show every unanimous and strategy-proof social
choice function on such domains satisfies Pareto property and tops-onlyness. Further, we
characterize all domains on which (i) every unanimous and strategy-proof social choice
function is a min-max rule, and (ii) every min-max rule is strategy-proof. As an application
of our result, we obtain a characterization of the unanimous and strategy-proof social choice
functions on maximal single-peaked domains (Moulin (1980), Weymark (2011)), minimally
rich single-peaked domains (Peters et al. (2014)), maximal regular single-crossing domains
(Saporiti (2009), Saporiti (2014)), and distance based single-peaked domains.
KEYWORDS: Strategy-proofness, single-peaked preferences, min-max rules, min-max domains,
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 BACKGROUND
We consider a standard social choice problem where an alternative has to be chosen based on
privately known preferences of the agents in the society. Such a procedure is known as a social
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choice function (SCF). Agents are strategic in the sense that they misreport their preferences
whenever it is strictly beneficial for them. An SCF is called strategy-proof if no agent can benefit
by misreporting her preferences, and is called unanimous if whenever all the agents in the society
unanimously agree on their best alternative, that alternative is chosen.
Most of the subject matter of social choice theory concerns the study of the unanimous and
strategy-proof SCFs for different admissible domains of preferences. In the seminal works by
Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975), it is shown that if the society has at least three alternatives
and there is no particular restriction on the preferences of the agents, then every unanimous and
strategy-proof SCF is dictatorial, that is, a particular agent in the society determines the outcome
regardless of the preferences of the others. The celebrated Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem hinges
crucially on the assumption that the admissible domain of each agent is unrestricted. However, it
is well established that in many economic and political applications, there are natural restrictions
on such domains. For instance, in the models of locating a firm in a unidimensional spatial
market (Hotelling (1929)), setting the rate of carbon dioxide emissions (Black (1948)), setting
the level of public expenditure (Romer and Rosenthal (1979)), and so on, preferences admit a
natural restriction widely known as single-peakedness. Roughly speaking, single-peakedness of
a preference implies that there is a prior order over the alternatives such that the preference
decreases as one moves away (with respect to the prior order) from her best alternative.
1.2 MOTIVATION AND CONTRIBUTION
The study of single-peaked domains dates back to Black (1948), where it is shown that the
pairwise majority rule is strategy-proof on such domains. Later, Moulin (1980) and Weymark
(2011) characterize the unanimous and strategy-proof SCFs on these domains.1,2 However, their
characterization rests upon the assumption that the set of admissible preferences of each agent
in the society is the maximal single-peaked domain, i.e., it contains all single-peaked preferences
with respect to a given prior order over the alternatives. Note that demanding the existence of
1Barbera` et al. (1993) and Ching (1997) provide equivalent presentations of this class of SCFs.
2A rich literature has developed around the single-peaked restriction by considering various generalizations and
extensions (see Barbera` et al. (1993), Demange (1982), Schummer and Vohra (2002), Nehring and Puppe (2007a), and
Nehring and Puppe (2007b)).
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all single-peaked preferences is a strong prerequisite in many practical situations.3 Furthermore,
the assumption that every agent has the same set of admissible preferences is also quite strong.
This motivates us to analyze the structure of the unanimous and strategy-proof SCFs on domains
where different agents can have different admissible sets of single-peaked preferences. We show
that every unanimous and strategy-proof SCF on such domains satisfies Pareto property and
tops-onlyness.4 Moreover, we show by means of examples that the exact structure of such SCFs
will depend heavily on the domain. In order to obtain a tractable structure of the strategy-proof
SCFs, we restrict our attention to top-connected single-peaked domains. The top-connectedness
property with respect to a prior order requires that for every two consecutive (in that prior order)
alternatives, there exists a preference that places one at the top and the other at the second-ranked
position.5 In this paper, we provide a characterization of the unanimous and strategy-proof SCFs
on top-connected single-peaked domains.
The unanimous and strategy-proof SCFs on the maximal single-peaked domain are known
as min-max rules (Moulin (1980), Weymark (2011)). Min-max rules are quite popular for their
desirable properties like tops-onlyness, Pareto property, and anonymity (for a subclass of min-max
rules called median rules). Owing to the desirable properties of min-max rules, Barbera` et al.
(1999) characterize maximal domains on which a given min-max rule is strategy-proof. Recently,
Arribillaga and Masso´ (2016) provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the comparability of
two min-max rules in terms of their vulnerability to manipulation. Motivated by the importance
of the min-max rules, we characterize all domains on which (i) every unanimous and strategy-
proof social choice function is a min-max rule, and (ii) every min-max rule is strategy-proof. We
call such a domain a min-max domain.
Note that min-max domains do not require that the admissible preferences of all the agents
are the same. Furthermore, it is worth noting that in a social choice problem with m alternatives,
the number of preferences of each agent in a min-max domain can range from 2m− 2 to 2m−1,
whereas that in the maximal single-peaked domain is exactly 2m−1. Thus, on one hand, our result
characterizes the unanimous and strategy-proof SCFs on a large class of single-peaked domains,
3See, for instance, the domain restriction considered in models of voting (Tullock (1967), Arrow (1969)), taxation
and redistribution (Epple and Romer (1991)), determining the levels of income redistribution (Hamada (1973),
Slesnick (1988)), and measuring tax reforms in the presence of horizontal inequity (Hettich (1979)). Recently, Puppe
(2016) shows that under mild conditions these domains form subsets of the maximal single-peaked domain.
4Chatterji and Sen (2011) provide a sufficient condition on a domain so that every unanimous and strategy-proof
SCF on it is tops-only. However, an arbitrary single-peaked domain does not satisfy their condition.
5The top-connectedness property is well studied in the literature (see Barbera` and Peleg (1990), Aswal et al. (2003),
Chatterji and Sen (2011), Chatterji et al. (2014), Chatterji and Zeng (2015), Puppe (2016)) and Roy and Storcken (2016).
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and on the other hand, it establishes the full applicability of min-max rules as strategy-proof
SCFs.
1.3 APPLICATIONS
An outstanding example of a top-connected single-peaked domain is a top-connected regular single-
crossing domain.6,7 Saporiti (2014) shows that an SCF is unanimous and strategy-proof on a maximal
single-crossing domain if and only if it is a min-max rule.8 In contrast, our result shows that an
SCF is unanimous and strategy-proof on a top-connected regular single-crossing domain if and
only if it is a min-max rule. Thus, we extend Saporiti (2014)’s result in two ways: (i) by relaxing
the maximality assumption on a single-crossing domain, and (ii) by relaxing the assumption that
every agent has the same set of preferences. However, we assume the domains to be regular. Note
that in a social choice problem with m alternatives, the number of admissible preferences of each
agent in a top-connected regular single-crossing domain can range from 2m− 2 to m(m− 1)/2,
whereas that in the maximal single-crossing domain is exactly m(m− 1)/2.
Other important examples of top-connected single-peaked domains include minimally rich
single-peaked domains (Peters et al. (2014)) and distance based single-peaked domains. A single-peaked
domain is minimally rich if it contains all left single-peaked and all right single-peaked preferences.9,10
Further, a single-peaked domain is called distance based if the preferences in it are derived by
using some type of distances between the alternatives. It follows from our result that an SCF is
unanimous and strategy-proof on these domains if and only if it is a min-max rule.
1.4 REMAINDER
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We describe the usual social choice framework in
Section 2. In Section 3, we study the structure of the unanimous and strategy-proof SCFs on single-
peaked domains, and in Section 4, we characterize such SCFs on top-connected single-peaked
6A domain is regular if every alternative appears as the top-ranked alternative of some preference in the domain.
7Single-crossing domains appear in models of taxation and redistribution (Roberts (1977), Meltzer and Richard
(1981)), local public goods and stratification (Westhoff (1977), Epple and Platt (1998), Epple et al. (2001)), coalition
formation (Demange (1994), Kung (2006)), selecting constitutional and voting rules (Barbera` and Jackson (2004)), and
designing policies in the market for higher education (Epple et al. (2006)).
8Saporiti (2014) provides a different but equivalent functional form of these SCFs which he calls augmented
representative voter schemes.
9A single-peaked preference is called left (or right) single-peaked if every alternative to the left (or right) of the
peak is preferred to every alternative to its right (or left).
10Such preferences appear in directional theories of issue voting (Stokes (1963), Rabinowitz (1978), Rabinowitz
et al. (1982), Rabinowitz and Macdonald (1989)).
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domains. Section 5 characterizes min-max domains. In Section 6, we discuss some applications of
our results, and we conclude the paper in the last section. All the omitted proofs are collected in
Appendices A - D.
2. PRELIMINARIES
Let N = {1, ..., n} be a set of at least two agents, who collectively choose an element from a finite
set X = {a, a + 1, . . . , b− 1, b} of at least three alternatives, where a is an integer. For x, y ∈ X
such that x ≤ y, we define the intervals [x, y] = {z ∈ X | x ≤ z ≤ y}, [x, y) = [x, y] \ {y},
(x, y] = [x, y] \ {x}, and (x, y) = [x, y] \ {x, y}. For notational convenience, whenever it is clear
from the context, we do not use braces for singleton sets, i.e., we denote sets {i} by i.
A preference P over X is a complete, transitive, and antisymmetric binary relation (also called a
linear order) defined on X. We denote by L(X) the set of all preferences over X. An alternative
x ∈ X is called the kth ranked alternative in a preference P ∈ L(X), denoted by rk(P), if |{a ∈ X |
aPx}| = k− 1.
Definition 2.1. A preference P ∈ L(X) is called single-peaked if for all x, y ∈ X, [x < y ≤
r1(P) or r1(P) ≤ y < x] implies yPx.
For an agent i, we denote by Si a set of admissible single-peaked preferences. A set SN = ∏
i∈N
Si
is called a single-peaked domain. Note that we do not assume that the set of admissible preferences
are the same across all agents. An element PN = (P1, . . . , Pn) ∈ SN is called a preference profile.
The top-set of a preference profile PN, denoted by τ(PN), is defined as τ(PN) =
⋃
i∈N
r1(Pi). A set
Si of admissible preferences of agent i is regular if for all x ∈ X, there exists a preference P ∈ Si
such that r1(P) = x. Throughout this paper, we assume that the set of admissible preferences of
each agent i is regular.
Definition 2.2. A social choice function (SCF) f on SN is a mapping f : SN → X.
Definition 2.3. An SCF f : SN → X is unanimous if for all PN ∈ SN such that r1(Pi) = x for all
i ∈ N and some x ∈ X, we have f (PN) = x.
Definition 2.4. An SCF f : SN → X satisfies Pareto property if for all PN ∈ SN and all x, y ∈ X,
xPiy for all i ∈ N implies f (PN) 6= y.
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REMARK 2.1. Note that since Si is single-peaked for all i ∈ N, an SCF f : SN → X satisfies Pareto
property if f (PN) ∈ [min(τ(PN)), max(τ(PN))] for all PN ∈ SN.
Definition 2.5. An SCF f : SN → X is manipulable if there exists i ∈ N, PN ∈ SN, and P′i ∈ Si
such that f (P′i , PN\i)Pi f (PN). An SCF f is strategy-proof if it is not manipulable.
Definition 2.6. Two preference profiles PN, P′N ∈ SN are called tops-equivalent if r1(Pi) = r1(P′i )
for all i ∈ N.
Definition 2.7. An SCF f : SN → X is called tops-only if for any two tops-equivalent PN , P′N ∈ SN ,
f (PN) = f (P′N).
Definition 2.8. An SCF f : SN → X is called uncompromising if for all PN ∈ SN, all i ∈ N, and all
P′i ∈ Si :
(i) if r1(Pi) < f (PN) and r1(P′i ) ≤ f (PN), then f (PN) = f (P′i , PN\i), and
(ii) if f (PN) < r1(Pi) and f (PN) ≤ r1(P′i ), then f (PN) = f (P′i , PN\i).
REMARK 2.2. If an SCF satisfies uncompromisingness, then by definition, it is tops-only.
Definition 2.9. Let β = (βS)S⊆N be a list of 2n parameters satisfying: (i) βS ∈ X for all S ⊆ N, (ii)
β∅ = b, βN = a, and (iii) for any S ⊆ T, βT ≤ βS. Then, an SCF f β : SN → X is called a min-max
rule with respect to β if
f β(PN) = min
S⊆N
{max
i∈S
{r1(Pi), βS}}.
REMARK 2.3. Every min-max rule is uncompromising.11
3. SCFS ON SINGLE-PEAKED DOMAINS
In this section, we establish two important properties, namely Pareto property and tops-onlyness,
of the unanimous and strategy-proof SCFs on arbitrary single-peaked domains.
Theorem 3.1. Every unanimous and strategy-proof SCF f : SN → X satisfies Pareto property.
The proof of Theorem 3.1 is relegated to Appendix A.
Theorem 3.2. Every unanimous and strategy-proof SCF f : SN → X satisfies tops-onlyness.
The proof of Theorem 3.2 is relegated to Appendix B.
11For details, see Weymark (2011).
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4. SCFS ON TOP-CONNECTED SINGLE-PEAKED DOMAINS
In this section, we characterize the unanimous and strategy-proof SCFs on single-peaked domains
satisfying top-connectedness. First, we present an example to show that the structure of the
unanimous and strategy-proof SCFs on arbitrary single-peaked domains is quite intractable.
Example 4.1. Fix x, y ∈ X with y− x ≥ 2. For all i ∈ N, define the set of single-peaked preferences
Sxyi as follows: for all P ∈ Sxyi , r1(P) ∈ (x, y) implies ry−x−1(P) = x and ry−x(P) = y. In other
words, the set of preferences Sxyi is such that if the top-alternative of a preference is in the interval
(x, y), then all the alternatives in that interval are ranked in the top y− x− 2 positions, and x
and y are ranked consecutively after those alternatives. Similarly, define Syxi as follows: for all
P ∈ Syxi , r1(P) ∈ (x, y) implies ry−x−1(P) = y and ry−x(P) = x.
Let β = (β j)j∈N be such that β j ∈ [x, y] for all j ∈ N with min
j∈N
β j = x and max
j∈N
β j = y. Consider
the SCF f xy : SxyN → X as given below:
f xy(PN) =
 median{r1(P2), . . . , r1(Pn), β1, . . . , βn}, if r1(P1) ∈ [x, y)r1(P1), otherwise
Similarly, define f yx : SyxN → X as follows:
f yx(PN) =
 median{r1(P2), . . . , r1(Pn), β1, . . . , βn}, if r1(P1) ∈ (x, y]r1(P1), otherwise
Note that both f xy and f yx are unanimous by definition. We show that f xy is strategy-proof on
SxyN , but manipulable on SyxN . It follows from similar arguments that f yx is strategy-proof on SyxN ,
but manipulable on SxyN .
Clearly, no agent can manipulate f xy at a profile PN ∈ SxyN where r1(P1) /∈ [x, y). Consider a
profile PN ∈ SxyN where r1(P1) ∈ [x, y). Since f xy(PN) = median{r1(P2), . . . , r1(Pn), β1, . . . , βn}
and Sxyi is single-peaked, by the property of a median rule, an agent i 6= 1 cannot manipulate
at PN. Now, consider a preference P′1 ∈ Sxy1 . If r1(P′1) ∈ [x, y), then f xy(P′1, PN\1) = f xy(PN) and
hence agent 1 cannot manipulate. On the other hand, if r1(P′1) /∈ [x, y), then f xy(P′1, PN\1) =
r1(P′1) /∈ [x, y). However, by the definition of Sxy1 , uP1v for all u ∈ [x, y) and all v /∈ [x, y), this
means f xy(PN)P1 f xy(P′1, PN\1), and hence agent 1 cannot manipulate at PN.
Now, we show that f xy is manipulable on SyxN . Consider a profile PN ∈ SyxN where r1(P1) ∈
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(x, y) and r1(Pj) = x for all j 6= i. Then, by the definition of f xy, f xy(PN) = x. Let P′1 ∈ Syx1 be
such that r1(P′1) = y. Then, f
xy(P′1, PN\1) = y. However, since P1 ∈ Syx1 , by the definition of Syx1 ,
yP1x. This means agent 1 manipulates at PN via P′1.
Note that for all i ∈ N, Syxi can be obtained from Sxyi by swapping x and y in the preferences
with top-ranked alternative in (x, y). Furthermore, the ranks of x and y are bigger than y− x− 2.
This shows that, if x and y are far apart, then the structure of a unanimous and strategy-proof SCF
will crucially depend on the lower ranked alternatives of the preferences making the presentation
of such SCFs intractable. Therefore, we impose a mild restriction called top-connectedness
on single-peaked domains, and characterize the unanimous and strategy-proof SCFs on such
domains. We begin with a few formal definitions.
Definition 4.1. A set of single-peaked preferences S is called top-connected if for all x, y ∈ X with
|x− y| = 1, there exists P ∈ S such that r1(P) = x and r2(P) = y.
Note that the minimum cardinality of a top-connected set of single-peaked preferences with m
alternatives is 2m− 2. Also, since the maximal set of single-peaked preferences is top-connected,
the maximum cardinality of such a set is 2m−1. Thus, the class of top-connected set of single-
peaked preferences is quite large. In what follows, we provide an example of a top-connected set
of single-peaked preferences with five alternatives.
Example 4.2. Let X = {x1, x2, x3, x4, x5}, where x1 < x2 < x3 < x4 < x5. Then, the set of
single-peaked preferences in Table 1 is top-connected.
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12
x1 x2 x2 x2 x2 x3 x3 x3 x3 x4 x4 x5
x2 x1 x3 x3 x3 x2 x4 x4 x4 x3 x5 x4
x3 x3 x4 x1 x4 x4 x2 x5 x2 x5 x3 x3
x4 x4 x1 x4 x5 x5 x5 x2 x1 x2 x2 x2
x5 x5 x5 x5 x1 x1 x1 x1 x5 x1 x1 x1
Table 1: A top-connected set of single-peaked preferences
Now, we provide a characterization of the unanimous and strategy-proof SCFs on top-connected
single-peaked domains.
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Theorem 4.1. Let Si be a top-connected set of single-peaked preferences for all i ∈ N. Then, an SCF
f : SN → X is unanimous and strategy-proof if and only if it is a min-max rule.
The proof of Theorem 4.1 is relegated to Appendix C.
The following corollary is immediate from Theorem 4.1.
Corollary 4.1 (Moulin (1980), Weymark (2011)). Let Si be the maximal set of single-peaked preferences
for all i ∈ N. Then, an SCF f : SN → X is unanimous and strategy-proof if and only if it is a min-max
rule.
5. MIN-MAX DOMAINS
In this section, we introduce the notion of min-max domains and provide a characterization of
these domains.
Definition 5.1. Let Di ⊆ L(X) for all i ∈ N and let DN = ∏
i∈N
Di. Then, DN is called a min-max
domain if
(i) every unanimous and strategy-proof SCF on DN is a min-max rule, and
(ii) every min-max rule on DN is strategy-proof.
Our next theorem provides a characterization of the min-max domains.
Theorem 5.1. A domain DN is a min-max domain if and only if Di is a top-connected set of single-peaked
preferences for all i ∈ N.
The proof of Theorem 5.1 is relegated to Appendix D.
6. APPLICATIONS
6.1 REGULAR SINGLE-CROSSING DOMAINS
In this subsection, we introduce the notion of regular single-crossing domains and provide a
characterization of the unanimous and strategy-proof SCFs on these domains.
Definition 6.1. A set of preferences S is called single-crossing if there is a linear orderC on S such
that for all x, y ∈ X and all P, Pˆ ∈ S ,
[x < y, P C Pˆ, and xPˆy]⇒ xPy.
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Definition 6.2. A single-crossing set of preferences S is called maximal if there is no single-crossing
set of preferences S ′ such that S ( S ′.
In what follows, we provide an example of a maximal regular single-crossing set of preferences
with five alternatives.
Example 6.1. Let X = {x1, x2, x3, x4, x5}, where x1 < x2 < x3 < x4 < x5. Then, the set of
preferences in Table 2 is maximal regular single-crossing with respect to the linear order given
by P1 C P2 C P3 C P4 C P5 C P6 C P7 C P8 C P9 C P10 C P11. To see this, consider
two alternatives, say x2 and x4. Then, x2Px4 for all P ∈ {P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, P6} and x4Px2 for all
P ∈ {P7, P8, P9, P10, P11}. Therefore, x2Pˆx4 for some Pˆ ∈ D and P C Pˆ imply x2Px4.
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11
x1 x2 x2 x2 x2 x3 x3 x3 x4 x4 x5
x2 x1 x3 x3 x3 x2 x4 x4 x3 x5 x4
x3 x3 x1 x4 x4 x4 x2 x5 x5 x3 x3
x4 x4 x4 x1 x5 x5 x5 x2 x2 x2 x2
x5 x5 x5 x5 x1 x1 x1 x1 x1 x1 x1
Table 2: A maximal regular single-crossing set of preferences
REMARK 6.1. Note that a maximal regular single-crossing set of preferences is not unique.
The following lemmas establish two crucial properties of a (maximal) regular single-crossing
set of preferences.
Lemma 6.1 (Elkind et al. (2014), Puppe (2016)). Every regular single-crossing set of preferences is
single-peaked.
Lemma 6.2. Every maximal regular single-crossing set of preferences is top-connected.
Proof. Let S be a maximal regular single-crossing set of preferences. Then, by Lemma 6.1, S is a
regular set of single-peaked preferences. Take x ∈ X \ {b}. We show that there exist P, P′ ∈ S
such that r1(P) = r2(P′) = x and r2(P) = r1(P′) = x + 1. Without loss of generality, assume
for contradiction that for all P ∈ S with r1(P) = x, r2(P) 6= x + 1. Because S is single-peaked,
if x = a, then r2(P) = a + 1 for all P ∈ S with r1(P) = a, which is a contradiction. So, assume
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x 6= a. Because S is single-peaked and x /∈ X \ {a, b}, for all P ∈ S with r1(P) = x, r2(P) 6= x + 1
implies r2(P) = x− 1. Let C∈ L(S) be such that for all u, v ∈ X and all P, Pˆ ∈ S ,
[u < v, P C Pˆ, and uPˆv]⇒ uPv.
Take Pˆ ∈ S with r1(Pˆ) = x such that for all P ∈ S with Pˆ C P, r1(P) 6= x. Consider the preference
P˜ with r1(P˜) = x and r2(P˜) = x + 1 such that for all u, v ∈ X \ {x, x + 1}, uP˜v if and only if
uPˆv. Because r1(P˜) = x and r2(P˜) = x + 1, by our assumption, P˜ /∈ S . Therefore, since S is
regular single-crossing, it follows that S ∪ P˜ is also single-crossing with respect to the ordering
C′∈ L(S ∪ P˜), where C′ is obtained by placing P˜ just after Pˆ in the ordering C, i.e., for all
P, P′ ∈ S , P C′ P′ if and only if P C P′, and there is no P ∈ S¯c with Pˆ C′ P C′ P˜. However, this
contradicts the maximality of S , which completes the proof. 
The following corollary follows from Theorem 4.1 and Lemma 6.2. It characterizes the unani-
mous and strategy-proof SCFs on maximal regular single-crossing domains.
Corollary 6.1 (Saporiti (2014)). Let Si be a maximal regular single-crossing set of preferences for all
i ∈ N. Then, an SCF f : SN → X is unanimous and strategy-proof if and only if it is a min-max rule.
The following corollary is obtained from Theorem 4.1 and Lemma 6.1. It characterizes the
unanimous and strategy-proof SCFs on top-connected regular single-crossing domains. Note
that in a social choice problem with m alternatives, the cardinality of a top-connected regular
single-crossing set of preferences can range from 2m− 2 to m(m− 1)/2, whereas that of a maximal
regular single-crossing set of preferences is exactly m(m− 1)/2.
Corollary 6.2. Let Si be a top-connected regular single-crossing set of preferences for all i ∈ N. Then, an
SCF f : SN → X is unanimous and strategy-proof if and only if it is a min-max rule.
6.2 MINIMALLY RICH SINGLE-PEAKED DOMAINS
In this subsection, we present a characterization of the unanimous and strategy-proof SCFs on
minimally rich single-peaked domains. The notion of minimally rich single-peaked domains
is introduced in Peters et al. (2014). For the sake of completeness, we present below a formal
definition of such domains.
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Definition 6.3. A single-peaked preference P is called left single-peaked (right single-peaked) if for
all u < r1(P) < v, we have uPv (vPu). Moreover, a set of single-peaked preferences S is called
minimally rich if it contains all left and all right single-peaked preferences.
Clearly, a minimally rich set of single-peaked preferences is top-connected. So, we have the
following corollary from Theorem 4.1.
Corollary 6.3. Let Si be a minimally rich set of single-peaked preferences for all i ∈ N. Then, an SCF
f : SN → X is unanimous and strategy-proof if and only if it is a min-max rule.
6.3 DISTANCE BASED SINGLE-PEAKED DOMAINS
In this subsection, we introduce the notion of single-peaked domains that are based on distances.
Consider the situation where a public facility has to be developed at one of the locations x1, . . . , xm.
Suppose that there is a street connecting these locations, and for every two locations xi and xi+1,
there are two types of distances, a forward distance from xi to xi+1 and a backward distance from
xi+1 to xi. An agent bases her preferences on such distances, i.e., whenever a location is strictly
closer than another to her most preferred location, she prefers the former to the latter. Moreover,
ties are broken on both sides. We show that under some condition on the distances, such a set of
preferences is top-connected single-peaked. Below, we present this notion formally.
Consider the directed line graph G = 〈X, E〉 on X.12 A function d : E → (0,∞) is called a
distance function on G. Given a distance function d, define the distance between two alternatives
x, y as the distance of the path between x and y, i.e., d(x, y) = d(x, x + 1) + . . . + d(y− 1, y) if
x < y and as d(x, y) = d(x, x− 1) + . . . + d(y + 1, y) if x > y. A preference P respects a distance
function d if for all x, y ∈ X, d(r1(P), x) < d(r1(P), y) implies xPy. A set of preferences S is called
single-peaked with respect to a distance function d if S = {P ∈ L(X) | P respects d}.
A distance function satisfies adjacent symmetry if d(x, x + 1) = d(x, x− 1) for all x ∈ X \ {a, b}.
Below, we provide an example of a set of single-peaked preferences with respect to an adjacent
symmetric distance function.
Example 6.2. Let X = {x1, x2, x3, x4, x5}, where x1 < x2 < x3 < x4 < x5. The directed line graph
G = 〈X, E〉 on X and the adjacent symmetric distance function d on E are as given below.
12A graph G = 〈X, E〉 is called a directed line graph if (x, y) ∈ E ⇐⇒ |x− y| = 1.
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Figure 1: The directed line graph G on X and an adjacent symmetric distance function d on G
Then, the set of preferences in Table 3 is single-peaked with respect to the distance function d.
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8
x1 x2 x2 x3 x3 x4 x4 x5
x2 x3 x1 x4 x2 x5 x3 x4
x3 x1 x3 x2 x4 x3 x5 x3
x4 x4 x4 x5 x5 x2 x2 x2
x5 x5 x5 x1 x1 x1 x1 x1
Table 3: A set of single-peaked preferences with respected to the distance function d
Let G = 〈X, E〉 be the directed line graph on X and let d : E→ (0,∞) be an adjacent symmetric
distance function. Then, it is easy to verify that a set of single-peaked preferences with respect
to the distance function d is top-connected. Therefore, we have the following corollary from
Theorem 4.1.
Corollary 6.4. Let G = 〈X, E〉 be the directed line graph on X and let di : E → (0,∞) be an adjacent
symmetric distance function for all i ∈ N. Suppose that for all i ∈ N, Si is a set of single-peaked preferences
with respect to the distance function di. Then, f : SN → X is unanimous and strategy-proof if and only if
it is a min-max rule.
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we have studied social choice problems where different agents can have different
sets of single-peaked preferences. We have shown that every unanimous and strategy-proof SCFs
on such domains satisfy Pareto property and tops-onlyness. We have further shown that if such a
domain satisfies a mild restriction called top-connectedness, then every unanimous and strategy-
proof SCFs on it is a min-max rule. Outstanding examples of top-connected single-peaked
domains are maximal single-peaked domains, minimally rich single-peaked domains, distance
based single-peaked domains, and top-connected regular single-crossing domains. Finally, we
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have introduced the notion of min-max domains, the domains for which the set of unanimous
and strategy-proof SCFs coincides with that of min-max rules. We have shown that a domain is a
min-max domain if and only if it is a top-connected single-peaked domain.
APPENDIX A. PROOF OF THEOREM 3.1
Let us introduce a few pieces of notations that we use in the proof of Theorem 3.1. For a profile PN ,
we denote by min
2
(τ(PN)) the second minimum of τ(PN). More formally, min
2
(τ(PN)) = x if and
only if x ∈ τ(PN) and |{y ∈ τ(PN) | y < x}| = 1. Similarly, we denote by max
2
(τ(PN)) the second
maximum of τ(PN). Finally, for k ∈ {1, . . . n}, let SN(k) = {PN ∈ SN | |τ(PN)| = k} be the set of
preference profiles having k different top-ranked alternatives. Note that SN =
n⋃
k=1
SN(k).
Proof. We prove the theorem by using induction on the number of different top-ranked alterna-
tives at a profile. By Remark 2.1, it is sufficient to prove that f (PN) ∈ [min(τ(PN)), max(τ(PN))].
By unanimity, min(τ(PN)) = f (PN) = max(τ(PN)) for all PN ∈ SN(1). Take k ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}.
Suppose f (PN) ∈ [min(τ(PN)), max(τ(PN))] for all PN ∈ SN(k). We show that the same holds
for all PN ∈ SN(k + 1).
Take PN ∈ SN(k + 1). Without loss of generality, assume for contradiction that f (PN) >
max(τ(PN)). Take i1 ∈ N such that r1(Pi1) = min(τ(PN)). Consider P′i1 ∈ Si1 such that r1(P′i1) =
min
2
(τ(PN)). Then, by strategy-proofness, f (P′i1 , PN\i1) /∈ [min(τ(PN)), f (PN)). To see this,
note that if f (P′i1 , PN\i1) ∈ [min(τ(PN)), f (PN)), then agent i1 manipulates at PN via P′i1 . Since
f (PN) > max(τ(PN)), this means
f (P′i1 , PN\i1) /∈ [min(τ(PN)), max(τ(PN))]. (1)
Note that by construction |τ(P′i1 , PN\i1)| ≤ |τ(PN)|. Clearly, if |τ(P′i1 , PN\i1)| = k, then (1) contra-
dicts our induction hypothesis. Suppose |τ(P′i1 , PN\i1)| = k + 1. This means min(τ(P′i1 , PN\i1)) =
min(τ(PN)) and max(τ(P′i1 , PN\i1)) = max(τ(PN)). If f (P
′
i1 , PN\i1) < min(τ(PN)) then take
i2 ∈ N such that r1(Pi2) = max(τ(PN)), and if f (P′i1 , PN\i1) > max(τ(PN)) then take i2 ∈ N
such that r1(Pi2) = min(τ(PN)). Consider P
′
i2 ∈ Si2 such that r1(P′i2) = max2 (τ(PN)) if r1(Pi2) =
max(τ(PN)), and r1(P′i2) = min2
(τ(PN)) if r1(Pi2) = min(τ(PN)). Using a similar arguments as
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for the derivation of (1), it follows that
f (P′i1 , P
′
i2 , PN\{i1,i2}) /∈ [min(τ(PN)), max(τ(PN))]. (2)
Continuing in this manner, we construct a sequence of agents i1, . . . , il with r1(Pj) ∈ {min(τ(PN), max(τ(PN))}
and P′j ∈ Sj with r1(P′j ) ∈ {min2 (τ(PN)), max2 (τ(PN))} for all j = i1, . . . , il such that |τ(P
′
i1 , . . . , P
′
il , PN\{i1,...,il})| =
k and f (P′i1 , . . . , P
′
il , PN\{i1,...,il}) /∈ [min(τ(PN)), max(τ(PN))]. However, this contradicts our in-
duction hypothesis, which completes the proof of the theorem. 
APPENDIX B. PROOF OF THEOREM 3.2
Proof. Let PN ∈ SN, i ∈ N and P′i ∈ Si be such that r1(Pi) = r1(P′i ). It is sufficient to prove that
f (PN) = f (P′i , PN\i). Suppose not. Let r1(Pi) = r1(P
′
i ) = x, f (PN) = y, and f (P
′
i , PN\i) = y
′. By
strategy-proofness, we have yPiy′ and y′P′i y. Since r1(Pi) = r1(P
′
i ) = x, by single-peakedness
of Si and strategy-proofness of f , this means either y < x < y′ or y′ < x < y. Assume with-
out loss of generality that y < x < y′. Since f (P′i , PN\i) > x, by Pareto property, we have
max(τ(P′i , PN\i)) > x. Take i1 ∈ N such that r1(Pi1) = max(τ(P′i , PN\i)). Consider the preference
P′i1 ∈ Si1 of agent i1 where P′i1 = P′i .
Claim 1. f (Pi, P′i1 , PN\{i,i1}) = y.
Suppose not. Since r1(Pi1) = max(τ(P
′
i , PN\i)) = max(τ(PN)), we have by Pareto property,
f (Pi, P′i1 , PN\{i,i1}) ≤ r1(Pi1). Now, if f (Pi, P′i1 , PN\{i,i1}) < y, then i1 manipulates at (Pi, P′i1 , PN\{i,i1})
via Pi1 . On the other hand, if f (Pi, P
′
i1 , PN\{i,i1}) > y, then i1 manipulates at PN via P
′
i1 . This com-
pletes the proof of the claim.
Claim 2. f (P′i , P
′
i1 , PN\{i,i1}) > x.
Assume for contradiction that f (P′i , P
′
i1 , PN\{i,i1}) ≤ x. If f (P′i , P′i1 , PN\{i,i1}) < y, then by Claim
1, i manipulates at (P′i , P
′
i1 , PN\{i,i1}) via Pi. On the other hand, if f (P
′
i , P
′
i1 , PN\{i,i1}) ∈ (y, x], then
again by Claim 1, i manipulates at (Pi, P′i1 , PN\{i,i1}) via P
′
i . Finally, if f (P
′
i , P
′
i1 , PN\{i,i1}) = y, then
by the facts that y′P′i1y and f (P
′
i , Pi1 , PN\{i,i1}) = y
′, agent i1 manipulates at (P′i , P
′
i1 , PN\{i,i1}) via
Pi1 . This completes the proof of the claim.
Now, we complete the proof of the theorem. Note that since f (P′i , P
′
i1 , PN\{i,i1}) > x, if
max(τ(P′i , P
′
i1 , PN\{i,i1})) = x, then Claim 2 contradicts Pareto property. So, suppose max(τ(P
′
i , P
′
i1 , PN\{i,i1})) >
x. Take i2 ∈ N such that r1(Pi2) = max(τ(P′i , P′i1 , PN\{i,i1})). Consider P′i2 ∈ Si2 such that P′i2 = P′i .
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Using similar argument as for the proofs of Claim 1 and Claim 2, we have
f (Pi, P′i1 , P
′
i2 , PN\{i,i1,i2}) = y, and
f (P′i , P
′
i1 , P
′
i2 , PN\{i,i1,i2}) > x.
Continuing in this manner, we can construct a sequence i1, . . . , ik of agents with the properties
that (i) for all j = 1, . . . , k, r1(Pij) = max(τ(P
′
i , P
′
i1 , . . . , P
′
ij−1 , PN\{i,i1,...,ij−1})) and P
′
ij = P
′
i , and (ii)
max(τ(P′i , P
′
i1 , . . . , P
′
ij , PN\{i,i1,...,ij})) = x such that
f (P′i , P
′
i1 , . . . , P
′
ij , PN\{i,i1,...,ij}) > x.
However, since max(τ(P′i , P
′
i1 , . . . , P
′
ij , PN\{i,i1,...,ij})) = x and f (P
′
i , P
′
i1 , . . . , P
′
ij , PN\{i,i1,...,ij}) > x,
we have a contradiction to the Pareto property of f . This completes the proof of the theorem. 
APPENDIX C. PROOF OF THEOREM 4.1
Proof. (If part) Note that a min-max rule is unanimous by definition (on any domain). We show
that such a rule is strategy-proof on SN. For all i ∈ N, let S¯i be the maximal set of single-peaked
preferences. By Weymark (2011), a min-max rule is strategy-proof on S¯N. Since Si ⊆ S¯i for all
i ∈ N, a min-max rule must be strategy-proof on SN. This completes the proof of the if part.
(Only-if part) Let Si be a top-connected single-peaked set of preferences for all i ∈ N and let
f : SN → X be a unanimous and strategy-proof SCF. We show that f is a min-max rule. First, we
establish a few properties of f in the following sequence of lemmas.
By Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 3.2, f must satisfy Pareto property and tops-onlyness. Our next
lemma shows that f is uncompromising.
Lemma C.1. The SCF f is uncompromising.
Proof. Let PN ∈ SN, i ∈ N, and P′i ∈ Si be such that r1(Pi) < f (PN) and r1(P′i ) ≤ f (PN). It is
sufficient to show f (P′i , PN\i) = f (PN). Suppose r1(Pi) = x, f (PN) = y, and f (P
′
i , PN\i) = y
′. By
means of strategy-proofness, we assume that r1(P′i ) = y
′ and min(τ(P′i , PN\i)) = y
′.13 Assume
for contradiction that y 6= y′.
13Since f (P′i , PN\i) = y
′, if r1(P′i ) 6= y′, then by strategy-proofness, f (P′′i , PN\i) = y′ for some P′′i ∈ Si with
r1(P′′i ) = y
′. Similarly, if r1(Pj) < y′ for some j ∈ N \ i, then by strategy-proofness, f (P′i , P′j , PN\{i,j}) = y′ for some
P′j ∈ Sj with r1(P′j ) = y′.
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By strategy-proofness, we must have y′ < x. This is because, if y′ ∈ [x, y), then agent i
manipulates at PN via P′i . On the other hand, if y
′ > y, then by means of the fact that r1(P′i ) ≤ y,
agent i manipulates at (P′i , PN\i) via Pi.
Let T = {j ∈ N | r1(Pj) < x}. For j ∈ T, let P′j ∈ Sj be such that r1(P′j ) = x.
Claim 1. f (P′T, PN\T) = y.
If T is empty, then there is nothing to show. Suppose T is non-empty. Take j ∈ T such that
r1(Pj) = min(τ(PN)). Because f (PN) = y and r1(Pj) = min(τ(PN)), by strategy-proofness and
Pareto property, we have f (P′j , PN\j) = y. Next, take k ∈ T such that r1(Pk) = min(τ(P′j , PN\j)).
Using similar logic, we have f (P′j , P
′
k, PN\{j,k}) = y. Continuing in this manner, we have
f (P′T, PN\T) = y.
This completes the proof of Claim 1.
Let T′ = T ∪ i. For all j ∈ T′, let P˜j ∈ S be such that r1(P˜j) = x.
Claim 2. f (P˜T′ , PN\T′) = x.
Take j ∈ T′ such that r1(Pj) = y′. Consider the preference P′′j ∈ Sj such that r1(P′′j ) = y′ + 1.
We show f (P′i , P
′′
j , PN\{i,j}) ∈ {y′, y′ + 1}.14 Suppose not. By tops-onlyness of f , we can assume
r2(P′′j ) = y
′. However, that means agent j manipulates at (P′i , P
′′
j , PN\{i,j}) via P
′
j . This shows
f (P′i , P
′′
j , PN\{i,j}) ∈ {y′, y′ + 1}.
Now, take k ∈ T′ \ j (if there is any) such that r1(Pk) = y′. Consider the preference P′′k ∈ Sk such
that r1(P′′k ) = y
′ + 1. Using similar logic as before, we have f (P′i , P
′′
j , P
′′
k , PN\{i,j,k}) ∈ {y′, y′ + 1}.
Continuing in this manner, we can construct a profile P¯N ∈ SN where r1(P¯j) = y′ + 1 for all
agents j with r1(Pj) = y′ and P¯j = Pj for all agents j with r1(Pj) > y′ such that
f (P¯N) ∈ {y′, y′ + 1}.
However, since min(τ(P¯N)) = y′ + 1, by Pareto property,
f (P¯N) = y′ + 1.
Using similar logic, we can construct a profile PˆN ∈ SN where r1(Pˆj) = y′ + 2 for all agents j
14If j = i, then the profile (P′i , P
′′
j , PN\{i,j}) is same as (P
′′
i , PN\i).
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with r1(P¯j) = y′ + 1 and Pˆj = P¯j for all agents j with r1(P¯j) > y′ + 1, and conclude that
f (PˆN) = y′ + 2.
Continuing in this manner, we move all the agents j in T′ to a preference P˜j ∈ Sj with r1(P˜j) = x
while keeping the preferences of all other agents unchanged and conclude that
f (P˜T′ , PN\T′) = x.
This completes the proof of Claim 2.
Now, we complete the proof of the lemma. Consider the profiles (P′T, PN\T) and (P˜T′ , PN\T′).
Note that for an agent j, if r1(Pj) > x, then her preference is the same in both the profiles
(P′T, PN\T) and (P˜T′ , PN\T′). Moreover, for an agent j, if r1(Pj) ≤ x, then her top-ranked alternative
is x in both the profiles. This means these two profiles are tops-equivalent. However, since
f (P′T, PN\T) 6= f (P˜T′ , PN\T′), Claim 1 and 2 contradict tops-onlyness of f . This completes the
proof of the lemma. 
The following lemma establishes that f is a min-max rule.
Lemma C.2. The SCF f is a min-max rule.
Proof. For all S ⊆ N, let (PaS , PbN\S) ∈ SN be such that r1(Pai ) = a for all i ∈ S and r1(Pbi ) = b for
all i ∈ N \ S. Define βS = f (PaS , PbN\S) for all S ⊆ N. Clearly, βS ∈ X for all S ⊆ N. By unanimity,
β∅ = b and βN = a. Also, by uncompromisingness, βS ≤ βT for all T ⊆ S.
Take PN ∈ SN. We show f (PN) = min
S⊆N
{max
i∈S
{r1(Pi), βS}}. Suppose S1 = {i ∈ N | r1(Pi) <
f (PN)}, S2 = {i ∈ N | f (PN) < r1(Pi)}, and S3 = {i ∈ N | r1(Pi) = f (PN)}. By uncompromis-
ingness, βS1∪S3 ≤ f (PN) ≤ βS1 . Consider the expression minS⊆N{maxi∈S {r1(Pi), βS}}. Take S ⊆ S1.
Then, by Condition (iii) in Definition 2.9, βS1 ≤ βS. Since r1(Pi) < f (PN) for all i ∈ S and
f (PN) ≤ βS1 ≤ βS, we have maxi∈S {r1(Pi), βS} = βS. Clearly, for all S ⊆ N such that S ∩ S2 6= ∅,
we have max
i∈S
{r1(Pi), βS} > f (PN). Consider S ⊆ N such that S ∩ S2 = ∅ and S ∩ S3 6= ∅.
Then, S ⊆ S1 ∪ S3, and hence βS1∪S3 ≤ βS. Therefore, maxi∈S {r1(Pi), βS} = max{ f (PN), βS} ≥
max{ f (PN), βS1∪S3}. Since βS1∪S3 ≤ f (PN), we have max{ f (PN), βS1∪S3} = f (PN). Combining
all these, we have min
S⊆N
{max
i∈S
{r1(Pi), βS}} = min{ f (PN), βS1}. Because f (PN) ≤ βS1 , we have
min{ f (PN), βS1} = f (PN). This completes the proof of the lemma. 
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The proof of the only-if part of Theorem 4.1 follows from Lemmas C.1 - C.2. 
APPENDIX D. PROOF OF THEOREM 5.1
Proof. The proof of the if part follows from Theorem 4.1. We proceed to prove the only-if part.
Let DN be a min-max domain. We show that Di is top-connected single-peaked for all i ∈ N. We
show this in two steps: in Step 1 we show that Di is single-peaked for all i ∈ N, and in Step 2, we
show that Di is top-connected for all i ∈ N.
Step 1. Suppose that Di is not single-peaked for some i ∈ N. Then, there is Q ∈ Di and x, y ∈ X
such that x < y < r1(Q) and xQy. Consider the min-max rule f β with respect to (βS)S⊆N such
that βS = x for all ∅ ( S ( N. Take PN ∈ DN such that Pi = Q and r1(Pj) = y for all j ∈ N \ i.
By the definition of f β, f β(PN) = y. Now, take P′i ∈ Di with r1(P′i ) = x. Again, by the definition
of f β, f β(P′i , PN\i) = x. This means agent i manipulates at PN via P
′
i , which is a contradiction to
the assumption that DN is a min-max domain. This completes Step 1.
Step 2. In this step, we show that Di satisfies top-connectedness for all i ∈ N. Assume for
contradiction that Di is not top-connected for some i ∈ N. Note that since Di is single-peaked,
for all P ∈ Di, r1(P) = a (or b) implies r2(P) = a + 1 (or b− 1). Because Di is single-peaked,
for all P ∈ Di and all x ∈ X \ {a, b}, r1(P) = x implies r2(P) ∈ {x− 1, x + 1}. Since Di violates
top-connectedness, assume without loss of generality that there exists x ∈ X \ {a, b} such that for
all P ∈ Di, r1(P) = x implies r2(P) = x− 1. Consider the following SCF:15
f (PN) =

x if r1(Pi) = x and xPj(x− 1) for all j ∈ N \ i,
x− 1 if r1(Pi) = x and (x− 1)Pjx for some j ∈ N \ i,
r1(Pi) otherwise.
It is left to the reader to verify that f is unanimous and strategy-proof. We show that f is not
uncompromising, which in turn means that f is not a min-max rule. Let PN ∈ DN be such that
r1(Pi) = x and r1(Pj) = x− 1 for some j 6= i, and let P′i ∈ Di be such that r1(P′i ) = x+ 1. Then, by
the definition of f , f (PN) = x− 1 and f (P′i , PN\i) = x + 1. Therefore, because f (PN) = x− 1 and
x− 1 ≤ r1(Pi) ≤ r1(P′i ), the fact that f (P′i , PN\i) = x + 1 is a violation of uncompromisingness.
This completes Step 2 and the proof of the only-if part. 
15Here Di satisfies the unique seconds property defined in Aswal et al. (2003) and the SCF f considered here is
similar to the one used in the proof of Theorem 5.1 in Aswal et al. (2003).
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